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BLD-095        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3331 
___________ 
 
EDWIN ESTIEN, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARY LOU SHOWALTER, Correctional Healthcare Administrator;  
TRACY PARKES, Corizon Clinical Coordinator;  
LIEUTENANT RAY DUNKLES;  
CAPTAIN J. HARRIS; R.N. PAULA PRICE;  
DR. LUIS O. ARANEDA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 1-13-cv-02474) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 18, 2018 
Before:  RESTREPO, BIBAS and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Edwin Estien, Jr., proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the three remaining defendants in 
an action Estien brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  During the time relevant to this litigation, Estien was incarcerated at 
the State Correctional Institution in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania.1  In April 2012, Estien 
injured his left wrist and thumb after a fight with another inmate.  He was subsequently 
placed into the Restrictive Housing Unit, which houses inmates in disciplinary or 
administrative custody.  He claims that he did not receive any medical assistance for his 
injuries for three days before he was taken to the emergency room at a nearby hospital.  
He asserts that several institutional staff members violated his constitutional rights in the 
following months. 
Specifically, he claims that defendant Lieutenant Ray Dunkle caused a three-day 
delay before he initially received medical treatment, in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Estien also maintains that former Corrections Health Care Administrator 
Mary Lou Showalter and former Clinical Coordinator and current Health Services 
                                              
1  Estien is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield in 
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. 
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Administrator Traci Parkes intentionally delayed scheduling or requesting medical 
appointments for him on a number of occasions.  Finally, he asserts that Showalter 
violated his First Amendment rights by delaying or failing to request medical 
appointments for him in retaliation for his complaints to her. 
In September 2013, Estien filed a complaint against these defendants and three 
others.  The District Court dismissed Estien’s claims against three defendants early in the 
litigation but allowed his claims against Dunkle, Showalter, and Parkes to continue.  
They moved for summary judgment on Estien’s remaining claims, while Estien filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment.  The District Court granted defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment on September 28, 2017, denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  Estien timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment; thus, we apply the 
same standard as the district court.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 
(3d Cir. 2014).  We will “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is 
sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “all justifiable inferences are to be 
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drawn in . . . favor” of the non-moving party.  Id. at 255.  However, a mere “scintilla of 
evidence” in support of the non-moving party does not create a genuine issue of material 
fact.  Id. at 252.  Additionally, “the non-movant may not rest on speculation and 
conjecture in opposing a motion for summary judgment.”  Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. 
Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016).  We may summarily affirm a district court’s 
decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial 
question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment for defendants, as Estien 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against Dunkle or Showalter and failed to 
show that Parkes was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust 
available administrative remedies before bringing a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct 
by prison officials.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  “[P]roper exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is necessary” to fulfill the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  Woodford v. Ngo, 
548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).  An inmate must substantially comply with a prison grievance 
system’s procedural rules to avoid procedural default of a claim.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 
372 F.3d 218, 228-32 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ 
grievance policy involves a three-step process that an inmate must fully complete in order 
to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA.  See Booth v. Churner, 
206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). 
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Estien submitted numerous grievances between June and July 2012 relating to the 
care that he was receiving for his injuries.  Estien admits that although he initiated 
numerous grievances, he did not complete the three-step appeal process for any of them.  
He argues that he attempted to complete the full process for one grievance relevant to this 
appeal, but that his request for an extension of time to file his appeal was denied.  He also 
claims that he requested free photocopies of his appeal paperwork from the prison law 
library to pursue his appeal but was denied them as his prison account did not meet the 
threshold for receiving free copies.  He does not explain why that finding was inaccurate 
or demonstrate how it prevented him from pursuing that appeal.  Nor does he explain 
why he failed to pursue any of the other appeals.  Estien has not shown that he was 
“thwarted [in] his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies” such that the grievance 
process was not “available” to him.  See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Thus, Dunkle and Showalter are entitled to summary judgment.2 
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment to defendant Parkes, 
as Estien failed to show that she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.  
                                              
2  Defendant Parkes did not raise the issue of exhaustion in her summary judgment 
motion or subsequent briefs.  We note that Parkes did raise this issue in her answer to 
Estien’s complaint and that Estien was on notice of the exhaustion issue as the other 
defendants raised it and it applies equally to all defendants in this case.  Additionally, 
Parkes’ attorney asked Estien at his deposition about whether any of his grievances had 
addressed Parkes’ actions, and Estien admitted that most of them had not; he could not 
identify the one in which he believed he had included Parkes.  Nonetheless, defendants 
have the “burden of proving the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust remedies.”  
Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002).  As Parkes did not pursue this defense 
on summary judgment, we address the merits of Estien’s claim against her. 
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The Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by 
the Eighth Amendment.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  “In order to state 
a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to 
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”  Id. at 106.  Establishing a 
claim requires proving both an objective component—“a serious medical need”—and a 
subjective component—“acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate 
indifference to that need.”  Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that “there 
was objective evidence that [the] plaintiff had serious need for medical care . . . and 
prison officials ignored that evidence” or where “necessary medical treatment is delayed 
for non-medical reasons.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Estien’s only evidence in support of his deliberate indifference claim against 
Parkes is his personal belief that Parkes failed to schedule him to receive medical care 
between April 17-20, either delayed scheduling or failed to schedule a follow-up 
appointment on April 23 for hand surgery after his emergency room visit on April 20, and 
generally failed to timely schedule other external medical appointments. 
As the District Court concluded, Estien’s speculations are insufficient to allow his 
claim against Parkes to survive summary judgment.  The record demonstrates that Parkes 
is not a medical professional; she did not provide medical services.  She was responsible 
for the administrative duty of scheduling medical appointments for inmates, based on the 
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availability of external healthcare providers and the availability of prison personnel to 
transport the inmate to an external appointment.  She scheduled appointments only at the 
direction of prison medical staff; she could not initiate appointments herself.  Parkes did 
not have access to inmate medical records or their medical conditions in her 
administrative capacity. 
Estien’s medical records repeatedly contradict his assertion that any doctor 
recommended at the emergency room on April 20 that he be scheduled for a follow-up 
appointment on April 23, which is the only way Parkes would have been informed to 
schedule an appointment for him.  His remaining allegations are equally unfounded.  
There is no evidence that Parkes knew what Estien’s condition was, as she did not have 
access to his medical records.  Estien’s vague conjecture that Parkes somehow both knew 
about his condition and neglected to schedule medical care for him between April 17-20 
fails to establish her knowledge or that any medical professional informed Parkes about 
his condition and instructed her to take any action.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 
236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison 
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical 
prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter 
requirement of deliberate indifference.”).  Estien’s general allegations about Parkes’ 
failure to schedule later appointments at some point in the following months fare no 
better, as they are based entirely on his belief about what Parkes knew and do not 
specifically describe any instances when she failed to schedule him for medical 
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intervention as directed to by medical providers.  Thus, Parkes was entitled to summary 
judgment.
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